subject to (2)-(6). 
3. The consumer problem is to solve V H (A t , S t−1 ) = max
Lt σt π σ (σ t |σ t−1 ) max
subject to the budget constraint, for each σ t ,
Q(σ t+1 |σ t )A t+1 (σ t+1 , σ t ) = W t (S t−1 )L t + A t (σ t ) + D t (σ t , S t−1 ), where A t is the vector of assets {A t (σ t )}. The first-order condition for the consumption-labor choice is
Using the envelope condition and Q(σ t+1 |σ t ) = βπ(σ t+1 |σ), and using the additive separability of utility, the first-order condition for consumption implies C t (σ t ) = C t+1 (σ t+1 ) all σ t+1 , so that consumption is constant, say C t (σ t ) =C for all t. Using the functional form for utility, the first-order condition (11) reduces tō
4. Aggregate wages and the face value of wages are related by
5. The market clearing conditions for labor and output are
6. The law of motion of distribution is consistent with the policy functions of firms, households, and shocks.
Algorithm overview
In order to solve the individual firm's optimization problem, the firm needs to forecast next period's wage w(S) and next period's output Y (S), and it needs a transition law for the aggregate state.
In practice, it is infeasible to include the entire measure Υ in the state. Instead, we follow a version of Krusell and Smith (1998) to approximate the forecasting rules for the firm. We do so by approximating the distribution of firms Υ with lags of aggregate shocks, (σ −1 , σ −2 , σ −3 , k) where k records how many periods the aggregate shocks have been unchanged. Here k = 1, . . . ,k andk is the upper bound on this number of periods. We setk = 9. In a slight abuse of notation, we use S = (σ,
in the rest of this description of the algorithm to denote our approximation to the aggregate state. The law of motion of (our approximation to) the aggregate state is given by
and 0 otherwise. Given our parameterization for σ = {σ L , σ H } andk = 9, the total number of points for the mutually exclusive aggregate states S is 32.
We start with an initial guess of two arrays for the aggregate wages and output, w 0 (S) and Y 0 (S), referred to as aggregate rules. We then solve the model with two loops: an inner and an outer loop. In the inner loop, taking as given the current set of aggregate rules, we iteratively solve each firm's optimization problem until convergence. In the outer loop, taking as given the converged decisions from the inner loop, we start with a distribution of firms Υ 0 (z, x) and simulate the economy for T periods. In each period t, we record firms' labor choice { t+1 (z, x)}, borrowing {b t+1 (z, x)}, and default decisions {ι t (z, x)}. Moreover, we use (12) and (13) to construct new guesses w t+1 (S) and Y t+1 (S) for the aggregate rules. We then repeat the procedure until the arrays of aggregate output and wages converge.
Inner loop
Before we solve the inner loop, we discretize the idiosyncratic productivity shock z(σ −1 ) using the Gaussian quadrature method. The discretization of this shock consists of 12 productivity points for each level of volatility σ −1 and transition matrices π z (z |z(σ −1 ), σ) that depend on σ −1 and σ. The idiosyncratic state x is discretized into 15 endogenous grids that depend on the shocks z and the aggregate state S. The state space for the firm's problem has #S × #Z × #X = 5, 760 grid points.
We also discretize the revenue shock κ into 100 points using the Gaussian quadrature method and use it to evaluate the integrals in the firm's future value.
In the loop, taking as given the current set of aggregate rules, say, w(S) = w k (S) and Y (S) = Y k (S), we first construct the bond price schedule and borrowing limits recursively. We then solve firms' decision rules.
Borrowing Limits
We start with an initial guess for the borrowing limits M 0 (S, z) that is looser than the actual borrowing limit. We set grids for { , b }, with 32 points for and 64 points for b .
The grid for is set around the frictionless choice of labor and depends on {S, z}. The grid for b is endogenous and depends on {S, z, }. We update the grid on b with every iteration of the borrowing limit. With these choices, the resulting array for q(S, z, , b ) has #L × #B × #Z × #S = 786, 432 grid points.
Given M 0 (S, z), we construct the associated default cutoff
and the associated bond price schedule
In the first step of the iteration, we update the borrowing limit to M 1 (S, z) using
and then construct the associated default cutoff array κ * 1 (S, S , z , , b ) and bond price schedule array q 1 (S, z, , b ) using the analogs of (14) and (15).
We continue this process iteratively until the constructed sequence of borrowing limit arrays {M n (S, z)} converge. We then record the associated arrays of default cutoffs and bond price schedules, denoted {κ * (S, S , z , , b )} and {q(S, z, , b )} which we hold fixed during each iteration of the firm decision rules that we describe next.
Firm Decision Rules Given the converged borrowing limits and associated default cutoffs and bond price schedule, we solve for the firms' decision rules iterating over a combination of policy functions and value functions. For each grid point, we solve a system of two nonlinear equations by interpolating over the policy functions using a multivariate finite element method. We use the Intel Fortran compiler using the IMSL routine DNEQNF.
Let γ(S, z, x) and µ(S, z, x) denote the multipliers on the nonnegative equity payout condition (2), denoted NEP, and the manager deviation condition (3), denoted M D, respectively. The following first-order conditions characterize firms' optimization problem (1):
where
and
,
∂b . In the iterations to solve for the firm decision rules, we iterate on a set of arrays of grids {X(S, z)} where X(S, z) = {x 1 , . . . , x N } , where the set of points {x 1 , . . . , x N } varies with (S, z). Let X 0 (S, z) denote the initial guess on the array of grids. We also begin with an initial guess for the multiplier function γ 0 (S, z, x) on the NEP condition and the value function V 0 (S, z, x) . Both the multiplier functions and the value functions are defined not just on the grid but also for all values of x in a range [−M (S, z), ∞] as we interpolate between the grid points.
For each iteration n, given the array of grids {X n (S, z)}, the multipliers {γ n (S, z, x)} and the value function {V n (S, z, x)} from the previous iteration, we solve for the updated array of grids X n+1 (S, z) , the multiplier function γ n+1 (S, z, x) and the value function V n+1 (S, z, x) in two steps. In these steps, we use the fact that for all cash-on-hand levels x greater than some cutoff levelx(S, z) the NEP is not binding and the decision rules for labor (S, z, x) and debt b (S, z, x) do not vary with x. We refer to the associated values of labor and debt as the nonbinding levels of labor and debt and denote them byˆ (S, z) andb(S, z). So given γ n (S, z, x) and the value function {V n (S, z, x)}, we proceed as follows.
1. Solve for the cutoffx(S, z) by solving for the valuesˆ (S, z) andb(S, z). To do so, we impose that the NEP condition is not binding.
(a) Assume the manager deviation condition MD is also not binding and solve for the tentative solutions tent (S, z) and b tent (S, z). The tentative solutions solve the following two equations in and b :
We then check whether the constructed tentative solutions satisfy the manager deviation condition. If so, then we set f (S, z) = tent (S, z) and b f (S, z) = b tent (S, z). If not, we continue to step (b).
(b) If we reach this step, we know that the manager deviation condition is binding. We thus impose the MD condition with equality and defineˆ (S, z) andb(S, z) as the solution to
where this last equation is derived by combining the two first-order conditions in (16) and eliminating the multipliers.
(c) Construct the grid X n+1 (S, z) = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N } by setting
That is, we know that if the cash-on-hand x is so low that even if the firm borrows the maximum amount M (S, z), the associated dividends d = x + M (S, z) is negative, the firm will default. We also know that if the cash-on-hand is sufficiently high, so that x ≥x(S, z), the optimal decisions will be given by the nonbinding levels of labor and debtˆ (S, z) andb(S, z). We then choose a set of intermediate points {x 2 , . . . , x N −1 }.
Solve for decisions at the intermediate points.
We claim that at any of these intermediate points with −M (S, z) < x <x(S, z), the MD condition is not binding. To prove this claim, we note that since x <x(S, z), then −x > −x(S, z), and the firm must borrow more at x than atx to keep dividends nonnegative. Since atx the nonnegative equity payout condition binds, implying d = 0, then from d =x + qb and the manager deviation condition, we know that 
Let the solution be (S, z, x) and b (S, z, x). We then compute the new multiplier γ n+1 from
where the derivatives are evaluated at the solution (S, z, x) and b (S, z, x).
3. We then update the value function to V n+1 using
where and b are shorthand notations for (S, z, x) and b(S, z, x).
4. Iterate. We iterate steps 1-3 until the multipliers γ n (S, z, x) and the value functions V n (S, z, x) converge.
Outer loop
We simulate the model for T periods. For each period, the economy has an aggregate state of S t = (σ t , σ t−1 , σ t−2 , σ t−3 , k t ). We set a time-varying grid of X t (z) of 80 points. The time-varying distribution of firms Υ t (z, x) is an array of 12 × 80 = 960 points.
1. For each firm in the distribution Υ t , we define the default decision ι t (z, x) by ι t (z, x) = 1 if and only if x ≤ −M (S t , z). For nondefaulting firms, we calculate their labor choice t+1 (z, x) and debt choice b t+1 (z, x) by interpolating the decision rules (S t , z, x) and b(S t , z, x) from the inner loop. Summing over default decisions of firms, we get the total mass of exiting firms
2. We find the labor and debt of new entrants ( e t+1 (ω), b e t+1 (ω)). A new entrant can enter if it draws a sufficiently low entry cost in that
We assume that from the measure of potential entrants with ω ≤ M (S t , z e ), a subset is chosen randomly so that the measure of entering firms equals E t . Upon entry, the labor choice and new borrowing are given by e t+1 (ω, z) = (S t , z, −ω), b e t+1 (ω, z) = b(S t , z, −ω), respectively.
3. Next period's output is given by
and next period's wage is given by
Since the choices of x t+1 vary smoothly with the shocks at t and we record only a finite number of grid points x i for i = 1, ..., N , when updating the distribution Υ we need to assign the mass for any (z , x t+1 ) to points on the grid (z , x i ). We do so by allocating the mass for any x t+1 to the two closest grid points x i−1 and x i where x i−1 ≤ x t+1 ≤ x i in proportion to how close the point is to each. Specifically, let Λ(x i , x t+1 ) be the probability that the choice of x t+1 is assigned to x i−1 or x i :
Λ(x i , x t+1 ) = x t+1 − x i−1 x i − x i−1 and Λ(x i−1 , x t+1 ) = 1 − Λ(x i , x t+1 ), and Λ(x i , x t+1 ) = 0 if x t+1 / ∈ [x i−1 , x i+1 ]. Then next period's distribution Υ t+1 (z , x i ) for x i on X t+1 (z ) is given by
Λ(x i , x t+1 (z, x, z , κ ))dΦ(κ ) π(z |z, σ t )Υ t (z, x), where x t+1 and κ * t+1 are given by x t+1 (z, x; z , κ ) = z Y (S t ) 1 γ t+1 (z, x) α h − w(S t ) t+1 (z , x) − b t+1 (z, x) − κ , κ * t+1 (z , z, x) = κ * (S t , σ t+1 , S t+1 , z , (S t , z, x), b (S, z, x)).
We finally project the simulated values for wages and output on a set of dummy variables corresponding to the state S. We use the fitted values as the new aggregate rules w(S) = w k+1 (S) and Y (S) = Y k+1 (S).
